*AI-generated translation, for reference only.

Recently, the Intellectual Property Court of the Supreme People's Court concluded an appeal case regarding a dispute over infringement of invention patent. On the basis of finding that the accused infringing product did not fall within the scope of the patent-in-suit, the Court explicitly condemned the various improper conducts of the patentee during the litigation that violated the principle of good faith.

Lu [REDACTED] mei Company filed a lawsuit with the court of first instance, alleging that it was the patentee of an invention patent titled "An Electronic Dog" (hereinafter referred to as the patent-in-suit). It claimed that the "Gox" robot dog manufactured by Yu [REDACTED] Company (hereinafter referred to as the accused infringing product) fell within the scope of the patent-in-suit, constituted infringement, and that the infringing profits amounted to tens of millions of RMB. Lu [REDACTED] mei Company requested the court to order Yu [REDACTED] Company to immediately cease infringement and compensate Lu [REDACTED] mei Company for 500 RMB (actual amount subject to judicial audit by the People's Court), and also requested the court to order Yu [REDACTED] Company to bear punitive damages at 3-5 times the infringing profits (actual amount subject to judicial audit by the People's Court). Yu [REDACTED] Company defended in the first instance, arguing that the accused infringing product did not constitute infringement; that Lu [REDACTED] mei Company's claimed huge losses were unsupported by any evidence; and that Lu [REDACTED] mei Company's claim for 500 RMB compensation fell under statutory compensation, making any audit of Yu [REDACTED] Company unnecessary. It requested the rejection of all of Lu [REDACTED] mei Company's claims.

The court of first instance ascertained that the original patentee of the patent-in-suit was a third party, Jian [REDACTED] Company. The patent application date was June 7, 2016, and the authorization announcement date was August 17, 2018. On January 16, 2025, the patentee was changed to another third party, Lian [REDACTED] Company, and then to Lu [REDACTED] mei Company on June 25, 2025. Lu [REDACTED] mei Company initiated this lawsuit on July 1, 2025.

The court of first instance held that: 1. The accused infringing product did not possess the technical feature "the outer surface of the electronic dog is covered with color-changing bionic fur" as defined in claim 1 of the patent-in-suit. The features argued by Lu [REDACTED] mei Company, such as paint, carrying handles, or clothing, did not constitute equivalents. 2. The foot-end force sensor in the accused infringing product was used to accurately sense foot-end contact status to ensure stable movement, and the product could not operate on wet floors. In contrast, the "liquid level sensor" in the patent-in-suit was used to detect accumulated water at the location and provide timely warnings to the user; these were not equivalents. 3. The function of the LiDAR in the accused infringing product was to obtain real-time 3D information of the surrounding environment, thereby enabling intelligent obstacle avoidance during movement and ensuring the safety of the robot dog and its surroundings. This was not equivalent to the "gas sensor" in the patent-in-suit. Based on these findings, the court of first instance rejected all of Lu [REDACTED] mei Company's claims.

Dissatisfied with the first-instance judgment, Lu [REDACTED] mei Company appealed, arguing that the technical feature "the outer surface of the electronic dog is covered with color-changing bionic fur" defined in claim 1 of the patent-in-suit was a non-essential technical feature; and that the accused infringing product possessed technical features identical or equivalent to "the outer surface of the electronic dog is covered with color-changing bionic fur," "gas sensor," and "liquid level sensor." Yu [REDACTED] Company argued in the second instance that the accused infringing product at least lacked the three technical features "the outer surface of the electronic dog is covered with color-changing bionic fur," "liquid level sensor," and "gas sensor," and thus did not fall within the scope of the patent-in-suit.

The Supreme People's Court further ascertained during the second instance that: Lu [REDACTED] mei Company's claims in the first instance were erratic; on one hand, it sought damages of 500 RMB, and on the other hand, it requested that damages be calculated based on a "judicial audit by the People's Court." Before the second-instance inquiry, Lu [REDACTED] mei Company submitted an "Application for Advance Payment," requesting an advance judgment ordering Yu [REDACTED] Company to pay 80 million RMB. During the second-instance inquiry, Lu [REDACTED] mei Company explicitly requested damages of 80 million RMB and provided a detailed explanation of the calculation basis. However, the very next day, it submitted a "Clarification Letter on Litigation Subject Matter," adjusting the claimed damages amount back to 500 RMB.

Regarding the infringement comparison in this case, the Supreme People's Court held in the second instance that all technical features written into a claim are essential technical features. For a finding of infringement, the accused infringing technical solution must contain technical features that are identical or equivalent to all the technical features recited in the claim. If any feature is missing or is neither identical nor equivalent, it should not be found to fall within the scope of the patent. Lu [REDACTED] mei Company's argument that the "color-changing bionic fur" was a non-essential technical feature lacked legal basis. Furthermore, upon review, the accused infringing product did not possess technical features identical or equivalent to "the outer surface of the electronic dog is covered with color-changing bionic fur," "gas sensor," and "liquid level sensor" from claim 1 of the patent-in-suit, and therefore did not fall within its scope of protection.

Regarding the various abnormal behaviors of the right holder during the litigation of this case, the Supreme People's Court specifically pointed out in its second-instance judgment that anyone exercising rights and participating in litigation must adhere to the principle of good faith. Lu [REDACTED] mei Company filed this lawsuit against Yu [REDACTED] Company merely five days after obtaining the patent-in-suit from a third party. In its complaint, it claimed that Yu [REDACTED] Company's infringing profits amounted to tens of millions of RMB, but on one hand, it only claimed damages of 500 RMB, while on the other hand, it requested that the amount be "subject to judicial audit by the People's Court." During the second instance, despite the first-instance judgment having clearly found that Yu [REDACTED] Company did not infringe and having rejected its claims, Lu [REDACTED] mei Company requested an "advance judgment" ordering Yu [REDACTED] Company to pay damages of 80 million RMB and used this as the claimed amount. However, merely one day after the second-instance inquiry concluded, it again claimed 500 RMB in writing. Lu [REDACTED] mei Company's conduct in the first and second instances can be described as both calculated and erratic, aiming on one hand to avoid the case acceptance fees payable for claims of high damages, and on the other hand attempting to impose additional litigation pressure on the opposing party. Lu [REDACTED] mei Company's actions violated the principle of good faith, and the second-instance judgment explicitly condemned them.

This case's second-instance judgment reiterated that the determination of patent infringement should strictly follow the "doctrine of complete coverage," and rejected the right holder's argument regarding so-called "non-essential technical features." The second-instance judgment particularly emphasized that patentees must abide by the principle of good faith in litigation activities, and explicitly condemned and negated their bad faith conduct.